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INTRODUCTION
In August 2016 at a Black & Decker facility in Tennessee, security
guards escorted an employee to the company parking lot as he cursed at
them and yelled racial slurs.1 When exiting the building, the raging
employee pulled out a knife and fought with security.2 The employee cut
car tires,3 raced to his vehicle in the company parking lot, retrieved his
automatic rifle stored within it, and fired 120 rounds at security, other cars,
and the facility.4 Law enforcement labeled the event an instance of
“workplace violence.”5 This violent workplace shooting was made
possible in part by a Tennessee law that forbids employers from
proactively banning firearms from their premises. In 2013, the Tennessee
Legislature passed a “Parking Lot,” or “Bring Your Gun to Work,” law
(“Parking Lot law”), which prohibited employers from instituting policies
that ban the storage of firearms in vehicles on company property, including
the parking lot.6 As a result, the shooter could keep his firearm in his
vehicle on the company parking lot, ready for such an attack.
Workplace violence like the Black & Decker incident is prevalent in
the United States.7 In 2010, there were 518 workplace homicides,8 405 of

Copyright 2018, by MALERIE LEIGH BULOT.
1. Maranda Faris, Man accused of firing over 120 shots at Black & Decker,
JACKSON SUN (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/crime
/2016/08/29/black-decker-suspect-facing-charges-fired-120-rounds/89517874/
[https://perma.cc/2ABE-CMVG].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Fortunately, no one was injured. Maranda Faris & Katherine Burgess,
Disgruntled Black & Decker employee arrested in shooting, JACKSON SUN (Aug.
25, 2016), http://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/crime/2016/08/25/shots-firedreported-near-passmore-lane-businesses-locked-down/89338202/ [https://perma.cc
/EW9A-7U2A].
5. Id.
6. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312 (2017).
7. This trend of workplace violence has persisted since at least the 1990s.
Workplace homicides declined in 2004, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (2005),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/aug/wk5/art04.htm (see chart) [https://perma.cc
/GY3G-RMBW]. Between 2006 and 2010, just over 3,000 people were victims of
workplace homicide. Id.
8. Workplace Homicides from Shootings, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS.,
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/osar0016.htm (last modified Sept. 16, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/ZK72-HZY7].
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which were shootings9 and 77 of which resulted in multiple fatalities.10
Despite potential workplace fatalities and the employer’s duty to provide
a safe work environment,11 employers in 21 states cannot prohibit
employees from storing firearms in vehicles on company parking lots.12
Though some workplace violence may be unavoidable,13 these Parking Lot
9. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. OFFICE OF COMMC’N, OSHA
TRADE RELEASE: OSHA ISSUES COMPLIANCE DIRECTIVE TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE
VIOLENCE (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_docu
ment?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=20637 [https://perma.cc/9AQA-FR86].
10. Workplace Homicides from Shootings, supra note 8. The trend continued
when in 2012 there were 463 workplace homicides, 81% of which resulted from
shootings. News Release: National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2012
(Preliminary Results), U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., https://www.bls.gov/news
.release/archives/cfoi_08222013.pdf (last modified Aug. 22, 2013) [https://perma.cc
/2M6Z-ZQ3Z].
11. See, e.g., Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1998); Gallose
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84−85 (2d Cir. 1989); MacNeil v. Labor
and Indus. Review Comm’n, 2012 WL 147861, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 19,
2012); Parsons v. United Tech. Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 700 A.2d 655, 666
(Conn. 1997); Sprouse v. Miss. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 639 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss.
1994) (Prather, J., dissenting); see also Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 654 (2012) (aiming to provide for a hazard-free work environment).
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2017);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2017); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-135 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2017); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 /
65 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (2017);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106 (West 2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2017); ME.
STAT. tit. 26, § 600 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. §
45-9-55 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3917-1313, 50-1-312; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34-45-103 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m) (2017). Given the general
prohibition, this Comment refers to these statutes as “Parking Lot laws.”
13. Some workplace violence is simply unavoidable—a company firearm
ban, for instance, will not ward off disgruntled employees who retrieve guns from
their homes, domestic violence situations that bleed into the workplace, or
robberies. See generally Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Employer Liability for Domestic
Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety
Net?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 139, 148 (2000). An employer may foresee violence
resulting from gun storage on company property. See Dana Loomis et. al.,
Employer Policies Toward Guns and the Risk of Homicide in the Workplace, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 830, 831 (2005). There is also some value in an employer
being able to maintain a ban of firearms. One 2005 study found that a workplace
without a firearm ban was seven times more likely to have a homicide than a
company with a firearm ban. Loomis et al., supra, at 831.
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laws nonetheless encumber an employer’s ability to ensure workplace
safety14 and exercise its private property rights.15
Although Parking Lot laws largely circumscribe an employer’s
authority, they are the law in their respective states and govern many
companies’ policies.16 Failure to comply with the statutes carries serious
implications for employers; depending on the jurisdiction, criminal
penalties or civil damages may be instituted against an employer who fails
to comply with the statutes.17 Most Parking Lot laws, however, fail to
provide an explicit right of action to an employee terminated for storing a
firearm on company property.18
When a Parking Lot law is not actionable on its face, an employee
must first examine his employment arrangements to determine possible
remedies upon termination. The majority of employees in the United
States are at-will, meaning that the employer or the employee may
terminate the employment relationship at any time for any reason.19
Because the at-will doctrine lends itself to uncertainty and arbitrariness,20
many states limit the negative consequences of at-will by recognizing the
14. See Loomis et al, supra note 13, at 831.
15. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730, 745 (1998) (“There is strong evidence that, with respect to interests in
land, the right to exclude is the first right to emerge in primitive property rights
systems.”); see also Sara Sahni, Gun Battle in Georgia Over Firearms at Work,
25 GA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2013).
16. 21 states have these laws. See supra note 12.
17. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90; FLA. STAT. § 790.251; GA. CODE ANN. §
16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312; see also
FLA. STAT. § 790.251(6) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106.
18. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781; GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65;
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10; LA. REV. STAT. §
32:292.1; ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 45-9-55; NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m).
19. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Joseph
Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments—At-Will
Termination of Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L. REV. 437, 437
(1995). At-will employment is the predominant employment doctrine across
states, so this Comment examines at-will employment as it relates to the tort of
wrongful discharge.
20. At any time and without reason, the employer or employee might decide to
end employment. Brad Rogers Carson, Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries:
Oklahoma Creates a Common Law Action for Employment Discrimination, 46 OKLA.
L. REV. 557, 585 (1993).
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tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (“WDVPP”).21 The
WDVPP tort is a public policy exception to at-will employment that curtails
an employer’s ability to fire an employee if doing so would infringe on some
well-established public policy.22 Though the breadth of the tort depends on
the state, such recognized public policies are encompassed in state Parking
Lot laws.23 These statutes elevate an employee’s rights to keep and bear
arms and to defend himself above the private property rights of his
employer.24
Though a state’s recognition of WDVPP and Parking Lot legislation
affords discharged employees a tort action for WDVPP, this Comment
argues that terminated employees must look for an alternate remedy when
the state they work in does not recognize WDVPP. In such a case, a
terminated, gun-storing employee may look to a “whistleblower” statute for
recovery.25
Part I of this Comment examines the Second Amendment and various
state Parking Lot laws and their exceptions. Part I also presents courts’ and
scholars’ determinations on the constitutionality of Parking Lot laws. Part
II explains the tort of wrongful discharge itself as it varies among the states
along with the public policy and whistleblower exceptions to at-will
employment. Part III focuses on a recent United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals case, Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation, in which
the Fifth Circuit became the first court to recognize a gun-storing
employee’s right of action against a former employer who violated a
state’s Parking Lot law.26 Part IV determines that the Swindol court
correctly decided the case after generally analyzing the rationale of
WDVPP and the public policy considerations behind the enactment of
Parking Lot laws. Part IV also argues that in the event a state does not
21. As of 2007, 44 states have recognized such an exception. Kenneth G. DauSchmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 313, 338 (2007).
22. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
24. Ethan T. Stowell, Top Gun: The Second Amendment, Self-Defense, and
Private Property Exclusion, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 521, 538 (2013).
25. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2017);
see also Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-AtWill Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX.
L. REV. 543, 549 (2004) (“The statutes typically protect three types of
‘whistleblowing’ conduct: (1) disclosure . . . (2) assistance . . . (3) objection . . . .”).
See generally Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and
The Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees to Disclose
the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1993).
26. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2017).
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recognize WDVPP, the existence of a whistleblower statute nonetheless
will provide a right of action to an employee terminated for storing guns
in his vehicle on company property. Part V surveys the employment laws
of Utah and Louisiana, which respectively include the WDVPP tort and
the whistleblower statute, and examines the circumstances surrounding
their Parking Lot laws’ enactment.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP ARMS IN PARKING LOTS
In 2008, following increased lobbying efforts by interest groups like
the National Rifle Association and a heightened public interest in gun
rights,27 the United States Supreme Court’s decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller28 reexamined the Second Amendment of the United
States Constitution,29 which grants the right to keep and bear arms, and
ultimately disregarded a century-old precedent.30 In Heller, the Court
shifted its understanding of the Second Amendment from a collective
right31 to an individual right.32 Accordingly, although the Second
Amendment encompasses an individual right to keep and bear arms, that
right is only that of the people against the national and state governments,33
and private actors are fully within their purview to limit firearm exposure
on their own land.34 Scholars nonetheless refer to Heller as a “limelight”
27. The National Rifle Association in the years preceding 2008 began to push
for the individualist view of the Second Amendment in its lobbying of Congress and
state legislatures and financing of presidential elections. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun
Law, Policy and Politics, 84 N.Y. ST. B.A. J., July-Aug. 2012, at 35, 35 (defining
the individualist view as one that the Second Amendment grants a personal right to
keep and bear arms to civilians, not just those individuals in a “militia”); Garry
Mathiason & Andrea R. Milano, “Bring Your Gun to Work” Laws and Workplace
Violence Prevention, 60 FED. LAW. 60, 61 (2013).
28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
29. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
30. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
553 (1875) (holding that the right to possess firearms existed only for those citizens
in a state militia).
31. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591.
33. Id. at 619−20. The Second Amendment also is effective as to state actors
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
34. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“An individual’s right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment, whatever
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case because the decision brought the Second Amendment squarely within
the public’s attention.35 With the subsequent focus on a citizen’s right to
bear arms, 12 additional states passed Parking Lot laws.36 These statutes
went “beyond the [traditional] protection of an individual’s right to keep
arms in the home” to include the right to keep arms on another’s private
property.37 The following sections distill the general provisions and
various limitations of Parking Lot laws and identify those instances in
which courts upheld the constitutionality of some of the statutes.
A. Parking Lot Laws Vary, but Policy Does Not
Parking Lot laws purport to protect gun owners’ rights on the private
property of others and, in so doing, limit employers’ and other property
owners’ property interests.38 These statutes either “prohibit property
owners from banning the storage of firearms locked in vehicles located on
the owner’s property”39 or forbid employers from “establish[ing],
maintain[ing], or enforc[ing] any policy or rule that has the effect of
allowing such employer or its agents to search the locked privately owned
vehicles of employees or invited guests on the employer’s parking lot . . .
.”40 The statutes give employees the right to store firearms in their vehicles
on a company’s private property.41 Pursuant to these laws, employers may
its full scope, certainly must be limited by the equally fundamental right of a private
property owner to exercise exclusive dominion and control over its land.”).
35. Stowell, supra note 24, at 523.
36. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800
(2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2009); 430
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65 (2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2010); ME. STAT.
tit. 26, § 600 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-1313 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-312 (2015); TEX. LABOR CODE
ANN. § 52.061 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103 (West 2009); WIS.
STAT. § 175.60(15m) (2014).
37. Stowell, supra note 24, at 521−22.
38. Some statutes not only govern private and public employers but also
affect the rights of other property owners, such as landlords, municipalities, and
others. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135.
39. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(a).
41. Employees are just one group that has the right to store firearms in their
vehicles, subject to some exceptions; for instance, invitees and/or customers may
also store firearms on another’s private parking lot in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.65.800(a) (stating “an individual”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781
(stating “a person”); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4) (stating “any customer, employee, or
invitee”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13.
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not implement policies that effectively ban the storage of guns at the
workplace, a restriction that infringes on their rights as private property
owners to use their land and exclude things or persons from it.42 To
somewhat compensate for this infringement, if an incident were to occur
as a result of firearm storage on the premises—like the violence at Black
& Decker—more than half of Parking Lot laws dictate the employer
cannot be held civilly liable for any resulting injuries or damages.43
If an employer bars gun storage on its property in an effort to avoid
workplace violence injuries, however, it would violate the Parking Lot law
and could result in criminal44 or civil liability.45 Conversely, the majority
of Parking Lot laws lack a private enforcement mechanism for individuals
harmed by a company policy illegally banning firearms. 46 Parking Lot
laws in 15 states fail to grant explicitly a right of action to employees who
are directly harmed as a result of unlawful company policies.47 Though
42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138 (1765) (“The third
absolute right, inherent in every [man], is that of property: which consists in the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution . . . .”). The right of property, from the time of Blackstone, has included
the right to use and exercise dominion over one’s property “in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *2; see also Merrill, supra note 15, at 745 (“There is strong
evidence that, with respect to interests in land, the right to exclude is the first right
to emerge in primitive property rights systems . . . .”).
43. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(c); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(5)(b); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(e); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(B) (2017); ME. STAT. tit.
26, § 600(2) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(5) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-02-13(3); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a(B), 1290.22(E) (2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1313(b) (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-104 (West
2017); WIS. STAT. §175.60(21)(c) (2017).
44. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18) (2017); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a,1290.22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312.
45. Employers may be held civilly liable in a civil or administrative action
commenced by the state’s Attorney General. See FLA. STAT. 790.251(6); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106.
46. See discussion infra Part II.A. Only Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee speak to possible civil actions for employees
to enforce Parking Lot laws. See infra Part II.A.
47. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2017); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65 (2017);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (2017); LA. REV.
STAT. § 32:292.1; ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 45-9-55; NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2017); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061
(West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m).
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these Parking Lot laws purport to extend the right to keep arms to a
company’s parking lot, most statutes do not provide employees with the
tools to protect their rights.
1. Guns on Company Property: Who, What, When, Where, How
Limitations
Parking Lot laws confer the right to store guns on company property,
but this right is not absolute, as the statutes contain many limitations.
These limitations are categorized in the following way: (1) gun
requirements; (2) limits on location; (3) vehicle requirements; (4)
employee requirements; and (5) alternative solutions for employers. First,
the guns stored in parking lots must be legal and out of sight.48 Second, if
the employer’s business is one requiring a certain level of safety, the
employer may nonetheless ban firearms.49 Parking Lot laws also generally
require that the employee’s vehicle be locked and properly parked on
company property.50 Many Parking Lot laws mandate that employees who
48. Many statutes require that the gun be “lawfully possessed” by the
employee, meaning that the gun is properly registered and the employee is
licensed in accordance with state gun laws. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-1190(b); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a). Some Parking
Lot laws require the gun be kept out of plain view. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A11-90(b)(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(A)(2); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 /
65(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(A); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1313(a)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(iii).
49. Such locations include the following: nuclear generating stations, see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(5); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 1611-135(d)(3); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(a)(22); schools, see FLA. STAT. §
790.251(7)(a); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18)(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(1)(a);
hospitals, see N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(g) (2017); correctional
facilities, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-35(d)(2); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(b)(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(5)(b) (West 2017);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-107; on or
near a military base, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(7); U.S. government
property, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(5)(a); where national defense,
aerospace, homeland security occur, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(d); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-135(d)(4); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(a)(19) (where one cannot carry a
firearm into parking area of “airport”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(c); or
where activities involving explosives occur, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(e); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(d).
50. The vehicle or the compartments of the vehicle containing the firearm must
be locked according to the following state Parking Lot laws: ALA. CODE § 13A-1190(b)(3); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(A)(1);
FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
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wish to store guns must have a valid permit for the gun51 or meet certain
criteria for gun possession.52 An employee must meet any or all of the first
four types of requirements, depending on the state.53 Failure to do so would
give the employer the right to enforce an otherwise unlawful ban or void
the employee’s right to keep arms on company property.54
In addition to gun, location, vehicle, and employee requirements,
employers in several states can take certain actions to further limit firearm
storage in the company parking area.55 For instance, an employer can
provide extra security for parking lots,56 post signage stating “no
28-7-2(a); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(A); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 69-2441(3); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(1)(a); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 1289.7a(A), 1290.22(B) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1313(a)(2)(B);
TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(ii). This
requirement applies only to employees’ vehicles because an employer can always
ban firearm storage in company vehicles. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(2); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(f); GA. CODE ANN. § 1611-135(c)(2); IDAHO CODE § 5-341; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(a); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-7c10(b); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(2); ME. STAT. tit. 26 § 600(1);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(4); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(e); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; WIS. STAT. §
175.60(15m)(b). In some states, the employee must have general permission from
his employer to park his vehicle in the company parking area and therefore store his
firearm in his vehicle. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b)(2); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-1313(a)(1).
51. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(3) (when
referencing “permitholder”).
52. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b)(1).
53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781; GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65; IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10; LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1;
ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH CODE ANN. §
34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m).
54. See supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12781(C)(3)(a)−(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(2); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(8); LA.
REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i).
56. In a handful of states, an employer who restricts or limits access to its lots
like with a gate or a guard may maintain and enforce a policy preventing storage of
firearms. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(3)(a)−(b);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3); MISS. CODE §
45-9-55(2). Similarly, if an employer provides an alternate lot for employees who
wish to store guns in their cars that is “reasonably” close to the normal parking areas,
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firearms,”57 or provide alternative storage for firearms.58 When an
employer takes one of those steps, he may continue to ban firearms from
areas with extra security, signage, or alternative storage.59 The intricacies
of the Parking Lot laws are numerous and varying, yet the root of this
legislation is the elevation of employees’ right to keep arms in their
vehicles above employers’ interests in property and safety of the work
environment.
B. Parking Lot Laws Held Constitutional, yet Subject to Criticism
Employers challenged some of the statutes in courts across the nation
on constitutional grounds.60 Employers asserted that the Parking Lot laws
were unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) they effected a “taking
without just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause;61 (2) the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH
Act”)62 preempted the state Parking Lot laws; (3) the statutes distinguished
between businesses without a rational basis for the distinction; and (4) the
statutes were unconstitutionally vague. Despite the employers’ best
arguments, courts largely upheld Parking Lot laws.63
1. Constitutionality Under the Takings Clause
Because Parking Lot laws limit employers’ right to use and exclude
from their land, challengers argued the statutes amounted to a “taking”
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.64 In the 2009 case of

the employer may restrict storage in the normal parking area. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12781(C)(8); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22(D) (2017).
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(3)(c).
59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12781(C)(3)(a)−(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. §
32:292.1(D)(3); MISS. CODE § 45-9-55(2); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(8);
LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i).
60. See Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); Fla.
Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”).
62. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012).
63. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.–3.
64. See Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1208; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d
at 1289−90; see also U.S. CONST. amend V.
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Ramsey Winch v. Henry,65 the United States Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed Oklahoma’s Parking Lot law that imposed criminal
liability on property owners.66 The employer, Whirlpool, brought the
initial action alleging the statute’s unconstitutionality on several grounds
and sought a permanent injunction against the statute’s enforcement.67
Whirlpool argued that restricting an employer’s property interest and right
to use his land constituted a taking.68 The court reasoned that merely
prohibiting all property owners from making certain usages of their land
did not constitute a per se taking or a taking under the Penn Central
Transportation Company v. City of New York factors.69 Instead, the court
analogized the case to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.70 In PruneYard, the Court did not
find a taking when California’s constitution prohibited a private shopping
65. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d 1199.
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(A) (2009).
67. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1202−03.
68. Id. at 1208−09. Whirlpool also argued that Oklahoma’s statute was
unconstitutional because (1) it was preempted by the OSH Act; and (2) it was
unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id.
The Ramsey court did not afford much weight to the vagueness claim because a
state law must be facially vague to be declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1211 n.11.
Based on the particular facts of the case, the court determined that the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
69. Id. at 1209−10. Traditional takings occur when the government
physically occupies land. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). When regulations are involved, however, a taking may nonetheless
still occur. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). There are two
types of regulatory takings in which some governmental regulation is such that it
effects a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Penn. Coal Co., 260
U.S. at 414−15. First, a Penn Central taking occurs when a consideration of the
following factors demonstrates that a regulation goes so far as to deprive a
landowner of land use: (1) the magnitude of the economic impact sustained by
landowner; (2) whether the landowner relied on old law or regulations such that
investment-backed expectations were impacted; and (3) the character of
government action, that is, whether it is similar to a traditional taking and targeted
towards a few landowners. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978). Second, a per se taking is one in which the Penn Central factors
are considered automatically satisfied; these takings include when a government
permanently and physically occupies private land and when a regulation deprives
a landowner of all reasonable economic uses. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432−33 (1982); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
70. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1207 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
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center from banning free speech in the form of petition circulation.71 The
Ramsey court determined that circumventing the shopping center’s right
to exclude in PruneYard is similar to the Parking Lot laws’ circumvention
of the employer’s right to ban guns from its property.72 Ultimately, the
Ramsey court found that the plaintiffs had “not suffered an unconstitutional
infringement of their property rights, but rather [were] required by the
Amendments to recognize a state-protected right of their employees.”73 This
Tenth Circuit decision is representative of lower courts’ refusals to find an
unconstitutional taking.74
2. Constitutional Because No Federal Preemption
Multiple courts likewise have found Parking Lot laws constitutional
despite employers’ claims that the federal scheme set forth in the OSH Act
preempted such laws.75 When a federal law either expressly or implicitly
preempts a state law, courts invalidate the state law.76 One of the main
71. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
72. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1207.
73. Id. at 1209; see also Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1289−90 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
74. No other federal courts of appeals have examined the constitutionality of
Parking Lot laws on takings grounds. See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d
1281. Contrary to the Tenth Circuit and Florida district court’s findings, one law
review comment suggests that Parking Lot laws do, in fact, effect an unconstitutional
taking. Stefanie L. Steines, Comment, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on PrivateProperty Rights and Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1171 (2008). The
commentator examined the Penn Central factors and determined that they “appear to
weigh in favor of finding of a taking” for three reasons: (1) an increase in workplace
violence increases economic costs for the employer; (2) the “investment-backed
expectations” prong is inconclusive in determining a taking; and (3) some statutes
impose criminal liability. Id. at 1189−96. Courts, however, have yet to adopt this
reasoning, and the statutes are presumed constitutional on takings grounds.
75. See Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d 1199; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281.
76. Preemption occurs because the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Express preemption occurs when a
federal statute either contains a preemption clause explicitly identifying which
state laws or regulations will be affected or contains some other clear statement
of congressional intent to preempt, thus giving states clear areas in which to
operate. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111−12 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Implied preemption can take multiple forms: (1) direct
conflict; (2) indirect conflict; and (3) field preemption. Direct conflict exists most
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types of implied preemption is field preemption, which occurs when a
regulatory scheme is so complex and far-reaching that “no room remains
for the operation of state law at all.”77 In such a case, courts infer that
Congress meant to occupy that particular field in its entirety.78 As such,
although a gap may exist in that comprehensive scheme, the breadth of
federal law implies that Congress meant to govern that gap.79
Opponents of Parking Lot laws claimed that the OSH Act is an example
of field preemption because the Act aims to ensure safe workplaces.80 The
OSH Act contains a plethora of “occupational safety and health standards
for businesses” to ensure safe work environments.81 Given the overall goal
of the OSH Act, employers argued that state Parking Lot laws implicate
issues for workplace violence, an aspect of the safe working environment82
that Congress aimed to protect with the OSH Act.83 In two notable cases,
courts disagreed with employers, holding that the OSH Act does not
preempt Parking Lot laws for two main reasons: the Act lacks specific
standards for workplace violence84 and the impetus for the Act’s enactment
was not to curb workplace violence but only “traditional work-related
hazards.”85 Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

clearly when a party cannot possibly comply with both the state and federal law.
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009). Indirect conflict involves a more
difficult analysis and exists when the animating policies of the federal law are
undermined by the state counterpart. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S.
51, 64 (2002).
77. Cook v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1093 (10th Cir. 2015).
See Thomas H. Sosnowski, Narrowing the Field: The Case Against Implied Field
Preemption of State Product Liability Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2286, 2295−98
(2013); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227−28 (2000); see also
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).
78. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401 (“[F]ield preemption reflects a
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is
parallel to federal standards.”).
79. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Research Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
80. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1203 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012)); Fla.
Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281.
81. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3)).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
83. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1202; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
84. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1208; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
85. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205. The Ramsey court relied on Congress’s
policy statement to bolster its “traditional work-related hazards.” Id. The OSH
Act’s preamble states, “Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising
out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon . . . interstate commerce
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(“OSHA”)86 issued voluntary workplace violence guidelines, the Tenth
Circuit declined to find that those guidelines constituted federal
preemption.87 Instead, the court determined that the issuance of guidelines,
as opposed to a specific standard, signaled that neither OSHA nor Congress
intended to preempt state regulation.88 Despite the OSH Act’s general duty
clause requiring employers to maintain a hazard free work environment,89
the court reasoned the clause could not preempt because it was overbroad.90
After these opinions in 2011, however, OSHA articulated an interest
in overseeing workplace violence.91 OSHA issued a manual providing

in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
Congress aimed “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
86. OSHA is the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the OSH
Act. About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. (2016),
https://www.osha.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/FJ4D-Y4XM].
87. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
88. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1).
90. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d
at 1298−99. These courts’ findings are consistent with that of one commentator
who argued that the OSH Act does not preempt Parking Lot laws because OSHA
has yet to articulate a standard for workplace violence and states are not foreclosed
from regulating such areas. Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave
it in the Parking Lot: Why the OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work
Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV 475, 491−92 (2009). The commentator found Congress’s
statement that “nothing in the OSH Act prevents states from regulating where no
federal standard is in place” to be dispositive. Id at 509 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)).
91. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR INSPECTING WORKPLACE
VIOLENCE (2011). This directive issued in 2011, of course, postdates many of the
state Parking Lot laws. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-781 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135
(2008); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2010); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2008);
MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55 (2006); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 62.1-02-13 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21 § 1289.7a (2004); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061 (West 2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-45-103 (West 2009). If a court were to find preemption based on
congressional intent to preempt, however, even those laws pre-directive would be
supplanted. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Motier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991). Therefore,
the timing of the federal and state laws’ enactment does not pose an issue for
preemption because even if a federal law, or in this case an agency manual, post-
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guidance for industries with a high risk of workplace violence and directed
its personnel to investigate all workplace homicides.92 One commentator
reviewed Texas’s Parking Lot law in light of the OSHA manual, finding
that unlicensed gun owners are not vetted and consequently might be
considered a workplace hazard under the OSH Act.93 The author determined
accordingly that the new OSHA workplace violence regulation might
indicate enough congressional purpose to support a finding that the general
duty clause of the OSH Act does in fact preempt the Texas statute.94
Although no court has considered the manual and statutes together to date,
it is possible that a court could find that the OSHA 2011 manual preempts
state Parking Lot laws.95
3. Unconstitutional When Statutes Distinguish Between Businesses
Notwithstanding the strong arguments for and against federal
preemption of Parking Lot laws, one court declared a state statute
unconstitutional on the basis of distinction.96 In Florida Retail Federation,
Inc. v. Attorney General of Florida, a federal district court held the Florida
statute unconstitutional because the statute treated businesses with
concealed-carry permitted employees and businesses without concealeddates the Parking Lot law, the state law still would be preempted and precluded
from enforcement. Wis. Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 605.
92. Brian G. Redburn, The Texas Parking Lot Law: Why Overbroad Legislative
Drafting Makes Chapter 52 of the Texas Labor Code Uniquely Susceptible to
Constitutional Challenges After the New OSHA Workplace Violence Regulations,
19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 761, 777−78 (2013) (citing ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR INSPECTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, supra
note 91). Industries are classified as high-risk for violence based on several factors:
(1) whether work deals with public or “unstable people”; (2) whether work is
isolated; (3) whether work involves money and valuables; (4) whether work
provides service or care; (5) whether the workplace serves alcohol; and (6) “the time
of day and location of work.” ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR
INSPECTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, supra note 91, at Abstract-1.
93. Redburn, supra note 92, at 779.
94. Id. at 781.
95. As of February 15, 2018.
96. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y. Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281
(N.D. Fla. 2008). A state statute’s distinction or classification is unconstitutional
when the distinction is not “rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.” U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any State . .
. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
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carry permitted employees differently.97 Although a business owner
without concealed-carry permitted workers could ban firearms from its
parking lots, businesses with at least one worker with a concealed-carry
permit could not.98 The court held this distinction unconstitutional, stating
that “without any rational basis, the statute’s provision on guns in
customer vehicles subjects some businesses to an obligation and
competitive disadvantage that otherwise-identically-situated businesses
do not face.”99 Today, no Parking Lot laws contain such a distinction.100
The handful of employers’ challenges to Parking Lot laws have been
unsuccessful.101 When a court declared a Parking Lot law unconstitutional
on grounds of distinction,102 the court still held that a state can force a
business to allow guns on to its parking lots.103 Despite some commentators’
arguments that the statutes were or are currently unconstitutional, courts
have yet to be presented with such a challenge.
II. ACTIONABLE VIOLATIONS OF PARKING LOT LAWS
Assuming Parking Lot laws are constitutional, the question remains as
to whether the existence of those statutes provides an employee terminated
for violating a company’s unlawful firearm ban with a right to recover
damages. The employment relationship is always contractual,104 whether
the parties form a contract with a duration of employment or rely on the
at-will default presumption that exists in 49 states and the District of

97. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (examining FLA. STAT. §
790.251 (2008)).
98. Id. The statute was problematic for employers who wished to ban
customers from storing firearms on their lots and was practically difficult to enforce
because workers and permit status could change frequently. Id. at 1291−92.
99. Id. at 1293.
100. See supra note 12.
101. See Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); Fla.
Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281. The legislature did not remove the
unconstitutional portion but rather just ignores the unconstitutional distinction.
See FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2017).
102. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
103. See id. at 1301.
104. “At its core, employment is a contractual relationship. The law of contracts
rests on a series of default rules,” like the at-will doctrine. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T
LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). Therefore, parties may contract for
different terms to rebut the at-will presumption. Id.; see also Stacy Gray, Note,
Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc.: Transforming the Punitory Effect of a Breach of
the Employee Duty of Loyalty?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 927, 929−30 (2000).
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Columbia.105 The ability of the parties in an at-will employment
relationship to terminate employment at any time allows the employer in
particular to act arbitrarily.106 As a result, the parties, state statutes, and
common law can modify the at-will employment default rules to curtail
potential arbitrariness.107 For example, the parties may circumvent the
uncertainty of at-will employment by varying these default rules via a
separate contract identifying the terms and conditions of employment.108
When parties fail to vary the at-will default presumption, the parties must
rely on statutory or common-law tort actions to recover for wrongful
termination.109
A. Express Rights of Action Within Parking Lot Laws
A minority of states’ Parking Lot laws grant such a statutory
remedy.110 Six statutes explicitly grant an employee a right of action
against an employer who violates their provisions.111 In these states, the
legislatures proactively articulated an exception to at-will employment112
105. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also
Barton v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 171 So. 3d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 2016). See
Kenneth R. Swift, The Public Policy Exception: Time to Retire a Noble Warrior?,
61 MERCER L. REV. 551, 554 (2010). See, e.g., Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112,
1116 (5th Cir. 1994); Ridenhour v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 774, 778
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Ex parte Michelin N. Am., Inc., 795 So. 2d 674, 677 (Ala.
2001). Montana is the one state that does not default to at-will employment. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2017). The state has a comprehensive
statutory regime granting the exclusive right of wrongful discharge. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914. This regime requires good cause to fire an employee.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b). Montana defines good cause as “reasonable
job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job
duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other legitimate business
reason.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5).
106. Carson, supra note 20, at 562. At any time and without reason, the
employer or employee might decide to end employment.
107. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
108. See Place v. Conn. Coll., 2013 WL 3388744, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013).
109. See discussion supra Part II; see also William R. Corbett, An Outrageous
Response to “You’re Fired!”, 92 N.C. L. REV. 17, 22 (2013).
110. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(g) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(e)
(2017); KY. REV. STAT. § 237.106(4) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-0213(1)(e) & (5) (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(C) (2017); TENN. CODE §
50-1-312(A−B) (2017).
111. See supra note 110.
112. If there is a public policy and a remedy is provided by statute, inquiry into
the wrongful discharge tort ceases. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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by providing employees with a mechanism to enforce the Parking Lot
laws’ provisions.113 Employees may file suit for damages, thereby
protecting the employee from termination, discrimination, or other adverse
actions on the basis of firearm storage.114 Though all six statutes give
employees a right of action, only Florida’s law does not do so explicitly.
Instead, Florida’s Parking Lot law merely prohibits an employer from
terminating employees who exercise their constitutional right to keep and
bear arms, which has been interpreted to create an implied right of action.115
Overall, these six statutes grant an action to terminated employees separate
from that provided by other statutes and tort law.
B. Blow the Whistle to Get a Remedy
Another statutory exception to the at-will presumption is the
whistleblower status of the employee.116 State and federal statutes117
enshrine the whistleblower exception, providing a cause of action to
terminated employees who report an employer’s illegal activities.118 There
are four major types of remedies that federal and state whistleblower
statutes afford: (1) those based on retaliation against whistleblowers; (2)
those that reward whistleblowers for speaking out; (3) those that reward
employers for investigating potential illegal acts and protecting
whistleblowers; and (4) those that punish a potential whistleblower’s
113. The six states are Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and Tennessee. See supra note 110.
114. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(g); KY. REV. STAT. § 237.106(4); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13(1)(e) & (5); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(C); TENN.
CODE § 50-1-312(A)−(B).
115. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(e). One employee who brought an action under
this statute, however, was unsuccessful because the facts of the case did not fall
squarely within the statute. See Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d
1381, 1385 (M.D. Fla. 2008). The court did recognize that the Parking Lot law
“create[d] an exception to at-will employment to prevent an employer from firing
an employee for possessing a firearm in the employee’s car while on company
property.” Bruley, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1386. This statement seemingly implies a
right of action, but it has yet to be expounded upon by the courts. In the instant
case, because the plaintiff-employee grabbed his gun from his apartment at the
complex he also worked for, he could not utilize the Parking Lot law to recover.
Bruley, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1383−84.
116. Swift, supra note 105, at 557.
117. Most notable is the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 151−169 (2012).
118. Julie Jones, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad
Interpretation of the Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine,
34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2003).
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inaction.119 These statutes constitute an exception to at-will employment
because whistleblowers have a “legitimate and respected desire to enforce
laws and regulations” and therefore should not be penalized for following
that desire.120 State whistleblower statutes vary greatly, however, resulting
in a “patchwork” of laws across the nation.121 In some states, what is often
referred to as a whistleblower statute acts as a codification of the commonlaw tort action for WDVPP.122 One such state statute is Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 23:967. Although generally called a “whistleblower” statute,123
this statute goes beyond the traditional protections that similar statutes
afford by making a termination actionable if an employee objects or
refuses to participate in his employer’s illegal acts.124
Whistleblower statutes are related to the tort of WDVPP125 in that the
former are predicated on the notion that when society declares conduct
illegal, it also is identifying a public policy that could be the basis for a
WDVPP claim.126 Where whistleblower statutes and public policy differ
is that whistleblower statutes provide a remedy to encourage employees to
report an employer’s illegal acts that harm the public in some way. 127 In
many ways, states often embrace whistleblower statutes over WDVPP
because they are narrower, providing specific instances in which a remedy
119. Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities
Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3356 (2014).
120. Jones, supra note 118, at 1138; see also Protecting Employees At Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931,
1933−34 (1983); Venessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro, Blowing the Whistle on the
Employment-at-will Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 339, 340 (1992).
121. Christopher Wiener, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and
Recommendations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 531, 536 (2010). For further discussion of the
murky whistleblower statutes, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?
Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes−Oxley Act
for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1087−1121, Appendix A (2004)
(summarizing all 50 states’ employment exceptions).
122. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017).
123. See Accardo v. La. Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 943 So. 2d 381 passim
(La. Ct. App. 2006).
124. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967.
125. See, e.g., Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (labeling Missouri’s whistleblower exception a second category of public
policy exception); Moyer v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc., 885 P.2d 391, 393 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1994) (“Kansas courts have recognized several public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine . . . [o]ne . . . is called the whistle-blower’s exception.”).
126. See Jones, supra note 118, at 1146.
127. See id.
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is available.128 Conversely, the public policy exception often is ambiguous
and unpredictable,129 depending on the state’s approach to sources of
public policy.130
C. The Tort of WDVPP: Common yet Complicated
The tort of WDVPP is not defined uniformly among the states, and some
states fail to recognize it at all.131 Those courts that do recognize WDVPP hold
“that certain terminations [are] counterproductive to the broader social
welfare, and with that came the rise of the public policy exception . . . .” 132
Consequently, if an employee’s termination offends some “well-established
public policy,” the tort of wrongful discharge is available.133 Such wellestablished public policies may be found in state constitutions, statutes,
jurisprudence, and administrative regulations, among other sources.134
Most states recognize some form of this exception,135 but some scholars
have questioned its utility because it “has been pleaded by employees in
cases in which public policy was not clearly implicated.”136 In an effort to
solidify what an employee must prove to bring a WDVPP claim, Professor

128. See id. at 1147.
129. “‘Public policy’ is an amorphous concept.” Danny v. Laidlaw Transit
Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 145 (Wash. 2008).
130. See discussion infra Part V.A.
131. “A clear majority of jurisdictions recognizes such a limit when the
employer discharges an employee in violation of a well-established public policy.”
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
132. Swift, supra note 105, at 556.
133. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). What
constitutes a well-established public policy varies among states, but some general
examples of such policies include employees’ rights to file workman’s compensation
claims or to report safety habits. Kashif Haque, The At-Will Employment Rule and Its
Impact on Wrongful Discharge Cases, 2013 WL 5290494 (Oct. 2013).
134. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
135. Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 21.
136. Swift, supra note 105, at 565−66 (“[T]he public policy exception is now
‘intended merely to provide a modicum of judicial protection for those who did
not already have a means of challenging their dismissals under state law.’” (citing
Van Kruinigen v. Plan B, L.L.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D. Conn. 2007))).
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Henry Perritt enumerated the following elements: clarity;137 jeopardy;138
causation;139 and overriding justification.140 Although this elemental
approach to public policy is relatively simple and efficient, only Iowa, Ohio,
and Washington adopted Perritt’s elements.141 Instead, many states are
unclear and vary in their approaches to determining public policy for the
tort.142
Employment-at-will is deeply ingrained in American employment
law; it forms the basis for the majority of employment relationships.143 The
at-will presumption benefits employers and employees because either can
terminate the employment relationship at any time.144 This benefit,
however, does not outweigh the great potential for unpredictability in
employment. Accordingly, several statutory and common-law exceptions
exist to curtail the arbitrary aspect of at-will employment.145 In the context
of Parking Lot laws, there are three potential routes for employee
recovery: (1) a grant of action in the Parking Lot law; (2) a whistleblower
action; and (3) a WDVPP claim. As to the third route, the recent Fifth
Circuit opinion in Swindol v. Aurora Sciences Flight Corp. examines
whether a terminated employee may base a WDVPP claim on a Parking
Lot law violation.146

137. See Henry. H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims:
Where does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398−99 (1989)
(“That a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal
constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law . . . .”).
138. Id. at 399 (“That dismissing employees under circumstances like those
involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy . . . .”).
139. See id. (“The plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the
public policy . . . .”).
140. Id. (“The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for
the dismissal . . . .”).
141. See Lower v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (S.D. Ohio
2007); Raymond v. U.S.A. Healthcare Ctr. Fort Dodge, L.L.C., 468 F. Supp. 2d
1047, 1057 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Leininger v. Pioneer Nat’l Latex, 875 N.E.2d 36, 40
(Ohio 2007); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996).
142. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
143. See Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 21.
144. Fleming, supra note 19, at 437; see also Tolmie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
930 F.2d 579, 580 (7th Cir. 1991); Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 805 F.3d
516 (5th Cir. 2015).
145. See discussion supra Part II.
146. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2016).
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III. SWINDOL V. AURORA SCIENCES FLIGHT CORP.: THE RIGHT OUTCOME
FOR MISSISSIPPI
In its examination of Mississippi’s WDVPP and Parking Lot law, the
Fifth Circuit became the first court to hold that a terminated employee
could base a WDVPP action on a violation of a Parking Lot law.147
Aurora’s Mississippi management fired employee Robert Swindol for
violating a company ban on firearms on company property when he stored
his firearm in his truck parked in the company parking lot.148 Swindol
brought suit in the Northern District of Mississippi, alleging WDVPP and
defamation.149 In support of his WDVPP claim, Swindol cited to the
Mississippi Parking Lot law and urged the court to interpret the statute so
as to “create a separate and additional public policy exception to the atwill doctrine.”150
The district court dismissed Swindol’s wrongful discharge claim,
reasoning that the Mississippi Parking Lot law did not provide an
exception to at-will employment.151 The district court instead held that
Mississippi law recognized only two such exceptions: (1) a “‘narrow
public policy exception’” mirroring a whistleblower exception; and (2) the
policy manual exception, pursuant to which a terminated employee
possesses a right to sue if the termination was in violation of the company
policy manual.152 Swindol appealed to the Fifth Circuit, maintaining his
position that Mississippi’s Parking Lot law should be interpreted to “create
a separate and additional public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
because doing so would fortify Mississippi’s public policy supporting the
right to bear arms.”153 Although the court agreed that the Parking Lot law
“clearly expresses a public policy prohibiting employers from barring
employees from possessing firearms,”154 the Fifth Circuit declined to carve

147. Id.
148. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 2014 WL 4914089, at *1 (N.D. Miss. 2014).
149. Swindol, 832 F.3d at 493.
150. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotations omitted). Similar to other Parking Lot laws, Mississippi’s statute
provides, in pertinent part, “a public or private employer may not establish, maintain,
or enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting a person from
transporting or storing a firearm in a locked vehicle in any parking lot, parking garage,
or other designated parking area.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(1) (2017).
151. Swindol, 2014 WL 4914089, at *4.
152. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
153. Swindol, 805 F.3d at 521 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id. at 522.
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out such an exception and certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.155
Much like Swindol’s proposed interpretation, the Fifth Circuit’s
certified question asked whether the Mississippi Parking Lot law created
an additional and completely separate exception to at-will employment
from the normal public policy exception.156 The Mississippi Supreme
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s wording of its certified question,
maintaining that the statute did not warrant a separate at-will exception
because the Mississippi Legislature’s mere passage of the Parking Lot law
created a public policy to be enforced with the tort of WDVPP.157
Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that the state’s
constitution also sets forth a protectable public policy in the right to keep
and bear arms.158
Upon receipt of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s answer, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Swindol had a cognizable WDVPP claim under
Mississippi law.159 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the [supreme] court
was holding that the relevant cause of action for discharging someone in
violation of this statute is the same as that already recognized for wrongful
discharges under [the narrow public policy exception case] McArn,
namely, a tort action with the same categories of relief being available.”160
As such, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal and
remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits because
Mississippi common law recognizes WDVPP for a termination violating
the Parking Lot law.161
This decision marks the first time a court held a Parking Lot law
actionable as providing the public policy for recovery under WDVPP.
Prior to Swindol, courts examined only a wrongful discharge claim based
on a Parking Lot law when the statute itself provided the employee with a

155. Upon a finding that diversity jurisdiction did exist despite Swindol’s
deficient complaint, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question: “[w]hether
in Mississippi an employer may be liable for a wrongful discharge of an employee
for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle on company property in a manner that is
consistent with Section 45-9-55.” Id. at 523.
156. Id.
157. “[T]he Legislature has declared it ‘legally impermissible’ for an employer to
terminate an employee for having a firearm inside his locked vehicle on company
property.” Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 194 So. 3d 847, 852−53 (Miss. 2017).
158. Id. at 853.
159. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 2016).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 493.
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cause of action.162 Courts continually declined to find a compelling public
policy in the constitutional right to bear arms to warrant an exception to
at-will employment.163 Even a federal court in Mississippi previously
declined to create an exception based on the Parking Lot law alone.164
Though the Swindol outcome only benefits Mississippi employees, it
would be desirable for many non-Mississippi employees.
IV. EMPLOYEE RECOVERY UNDER WDVPP AND WHISTLEBLOWER
STATUTES
The other 20 states with Parking Lot laws do not have precedents
providing a WDVPP claim to gun-storing employees. Though other state
courts have yet to reach a Swindol outcome, any state with a Parking Lot
law and either a whistleblower statute or recognition of WDVPP possesses
the tools to grant a right of action to an employee terminated for storing a
gun in their vehicle. This section looks to the rationale behind recognition
of WDVPP and whistleblower statutes. That very rationale supports a
cognizable claim in the context of all Parking Lot laws. When a state
neither recognizes WDVPP nor has a whistleblower statute, an employee
terminated in violation of a Parking Lot law is left without recourse.
A. Rationale of WDVPP
The Swindol court did not speak directly to the justifications for its
public policy exception, yet the very rationale behind even the narrowest
exception demands that courts recognize Parking Lot laws as clear
articulations of public policy.165 The basic proposition supporting the
public policy exception is that “in a civilized state where reciprocal legal
rights and duties abound the words ‘at will’ can never mean ‘without limit
or qualification,’ . . . for in such a state the rights of each person are
necessarily and inherently limited by the rights of others and the interests
of the public.”166 When at-will employment rules value workforce
flexibility, whatever occurs within the employment relationship must not
162. Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1385−86 (M.D.
Fla. 2008).
163. See Bastible v. Wyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 2006);
Plona v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 558 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2009); Hansen v.
Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004).
164. Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, L.L.C., 73 F. Supp. 3d 687, 692−93 (S.D.
Miss. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 2016 WL 4245455, at *1 (5th Cir. 2016).
165. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 194 So. 3d 847, 853 (Miss. 2016).
166. Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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offend the public interest.167 The public policy exception aims to “prohibit
an employer from placing an employee in the position of keeping a job
only by performing an illegal act, forsaking a public duty, or foregoing a
job-related right or privilege.”168
In examining a WDVPP claim, courts must conduct two analyses in
every case.169 First, the court must establish that the discharge violates
some well-established public policy.170 Second, the court must inquire as
to whether there is an existing remedy protecting the employee’s and
society’s interests.171 If no such remedy exists, then a claim for WDVPP
is available.172
First, the well-established public policy incorporated in Parking Lot
laws is the individual right to keep and bear arms.173 Though a
constitutional right limits only the power of federal and state governments
to interfere with the exercise of that right,174 the mere enactment of a law
giving employees the right to store firearms in their cars on private
property indicates that those state legislatures value the right to keep and
bear arms over employers’ property rights or safety concerns. Parking Lot
laws themselves create a right to keep arms in a particular area
independent from that of the state and federal constitutions.175
Parking Lot laws’ public policy qualifies as “well-established” under
any of the varying approaches to the public policy exception. The
narrowest approach is the “unlawful” approach in which a wrongful
discharge action only is available when the employee is fired for refusing
to participate in or for reporting an employer’s illegal acts.176 Under the
unlawful approach, the employee must demonstrate that his employer
directed him to perform the illegal act.177 The unlawful approach also
requires “an explicit statement of public policy in a statute that supports
167. Id.
168. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992).
169. Osborn v. Prof’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 679, 681 (W.D. Mo.
1994) (internal citations omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See discussion infra Part V.A.
174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
175. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y. Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281,
1295 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (“I conclude that when the statute refers to the ‘constitutional’
right to bear arms, it means the right to bear arms created by § 790.251 itself.”).
176. Thomas L. Cluff, Jr., In Defense of a Narrow Public Policy Exception of
the Employment At Will Rule, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 437, 449 (1996).
177. Id.
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the specific interest the employee is asserting.”178 Parking Lot laws
expressly prohibit company bans on firearm storage, thus making the
maintenance or enforcement of such a ban illegal.179 Under the unlawful
approach to identifying a well-established public policy, those 21 state
legislatures that enacted Parking Lot laws articulated a well-established
public policy that can be enforced via WDVPP.
A more expansive approach to identifying actionable public policies
is the “public purpose” approach, which “recognizes wrongful discharge
actions for employees who can allege that their terminations harm the
public good in any general manner.”180 This intermediate view requires “an
explicit declaration of policy, but recognizes sources other than specific
legislation, such as constitutional provisions . . . .”181 Under this approach,
Parking Lot laws give terminated employees a wrongful discharge claim as
well. An employee fired for bringing his gun to work and storing it in his
vehicle need only prove by using any source of law that his termination
harmed the public good.182 An employee could argue that by prohibiting
him from storing firearms in contradiction with a state’s Parking Lot law,
his termination harms the public good by infringing on a legislatively
bestowed right and the right to self-defense.183 Therefore, the termination
circumvents the people’s legislative will articulated in the Parking Lot law.
The broadest approach to the public policy exception is the “just
cause” approach, which bars any discharge that is not based on good
cause.184 The “just cause” approach encompasses most wrongful discharge
claims because it grants courts discretion in distilling public policy from
any source of law.185 The breadth of this method undercuts the doctrine of
at-will employment because no longer is “bad reason or no reason at all”
sufficient to end the employment relationship.186 Reasoning a fortiori, if
Parking Lot laws provide a strong and rooted public policy under the
narrower approaches, the broadest approach must also result in a tort
178. Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half
of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REV. 97, 104 (1991).
179. See supra note 12.
180. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 450.
181. Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104.
182. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 450; Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104.
183. See discussion infra Part V.A.
184. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 453.
185. The court is not tied to only “legislatively enunciated polic[ies].”
Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104 (internal quotations omitted).
186. This is an expansive approach, similar to “good cause” as defined in
Montana’s comprehensive regime displacing at-will in that state entirely. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (2017).
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action for WDVPP. The “just cause” view is that employers may not
terminate employees for anything but good cause.187 Therefore, an
employer who terminates an employee for keeping a gun in the employee
parking area would not satisfy the just cause requirement.188 Good cause
does not exist when an employee is fired for exercising a right in
accordance with a state statute.189 After conducting this analysis for
Parking Lot laws, there is a well-established public policy under all of the
various approaches. Also, in the 15 states whose statutes do not provide
an explicit cause of action, a statutory remedy for the employee does not
exist.
More state legislatures could have enacted specific remedies to avoid
the public policy question;190 however, the fact that a state even recognizes
WDVPP suggests that an express statutory remedy is not required in all
instances.191 Assuming the legislatures know of the possibility of WDVPP,
they likely intended for the common-law tort to fill the gap in the statutory
regime. After all, the WDVPP action is a “common law cause of action to
uphold policies established by legislatures,”192 and “the legislature has not
and cannot cover every type of wrongful termination that violates a clear
mandate of public policy.”193 WDVPP, therefore, represents both a remedial
gap-filler and a judicially created method to vindicate employees’ rights
against employers’ actions that are disruptive of public policy.194
Although WDVPP acts as a gap-filler, some scholars nonetheless
argue that the tort should not be so broad as to infringe on parties’ right to
contract freely for and terminate employment.195 Even the narrowest
public policy exception, however, allows for a wrongful discharge claim
because the right encompassed in Parking Lot laws is well-established and

187. Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104 (internal quotations omitted).
188. Norris v. Housing Auth. of City of Galveston, 980 F. Supp. 885, 894 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
189. Good cause is generally defined as an employee’s failure to perform his
employment duties that an ordinary employee could do. See id.
190. See discussion supra Part II.A.
191. See, e.g., Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee Dept. of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d
186, 192 (Kan. 1981) (finding that the legislature’s failure to grant a cause of
action in the text of the statute itself does not defeat the public policy).
192. David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful
Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J.
645, 662 (1996).
193. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841−42 (Wis. 1983).
194. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 171 (N.C. 1992).
195. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 444.
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significant.196 Given the above analysis, when a state recognizes WDVPP,
even in the slightest form, the state also must recognize a claim of
wrongful discharge for violation of its Parking Lot law, much like the Fifth
Circuit and Mississippi Supreme Court held in Swindol.197 Without the tort
of WDVPP, the employee must focus on statutory exceptions to at-will
employment for recovery.
B. Whistleblower Statutes’ Rationale and Rights of Action
The goal of whistleblower statutes is to protect both the public 198 and
whistleblowers from employers’ illegal acts and retaliation.199 Legislative
intent in promulgating such statutes is similar to a state’s purpose in
recognizing the WDVPP action.200 These statutes, therefore, aim to
encourage employees to report illegal acts by granting whistleblowing
employees a right of action against employers who retaliate or dismiss
them.201 Although whistleblower statutes vary a great deal among the
states as far as what an employee must do to claim whistleblower status
and protection,202 the rationale for whistleblower statutes is similar to that
of WDVPP. Therefore, a state’s whistleblower statute also gives employees
terminated in violation of Parking Lot laws a cause of action. Conversely, if
a state has neither the WDVPP tort nor a whistleblower statute, then the
employee does not have a claim against his employer because the at-will
employment doctrine governs.
The rationale of WDVPP and whistleblower statutes indicates that
state legislatures intended to enshrine public policies in Parking Lot
laws.203 As such, Parking Lot laws must be actionable. Legislatures
196. It is well established in the sense that it is clearly mandated by a statutory
provision. See Thomas P. Owens III, Employment at Will in Alaska: The Question of
Pub. Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 269, 311 (2003). It is significant because it
purports to promote the individual right of self-defense. See Parween S. Mascari, What
Constitutes a “Substantial Public Policy” in West Virginia for Purposes of Retaliatory
Discharge: Making a Mountain out of a Molehill?, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 827, 843
(2003). Ultimately, however, “policy determinations frequently are made on an ad hoc
basis, ultimately by the high court of the jurisdiction.” Cavico, supra note 25, at 591.
197. See discussion infra Part V.A. for the example of Utah.
198. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 448−49.
199. See generally Nathan A. Adams IV, Distinguishing Chicken Little from
Bona Fide Whistleblowers, 83 FLA. B.J. 100 (2009).
200. See generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The
State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000).
201. See Faqihi, supra note 119, at 3361–63.
202. See discussion supra Part II.B.
203. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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enacted these laws in light of the state’s existing WDVPP or whistleblower
statutes, contemplating that employees terminated in violation of the
Parking Lot provision would have some type of recourse against their
employers. A state’s recognition of WDVPP and whistleblower status
results in a right of action, much like the Swindol outcome.
V. APPLYING WDVPP AND WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES TO UTAH AND
LOUISIANA PARKING LOT LAWS
The following subsections are case studies of the Parking Lot laws of
Utah and Louisiana and potential actions for terminated employees. The
Parking Lot laws of these two states are representative of the statutes of
many other states because they contain many of the same prohibitions,
restrictions, and limitations seen in Parking Lot laws throughout the
country.204 Furthermore, Utah has a whistleblower statute only for public
employees205 but recognizes WDVPP, whereas Louisiana has a general
whistleblower provision broadly applicable to both private and public
employees but does not recognize the tort of WDVPP.206
A. Utah: A WDVPP State
Utah’s Parking Lot law is similar to many other states’ but does not
contain as many exceptions.207 Utah’s Parking Lot law provides: “[A]
person may not establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or rule that has
the effect of: (a) prohibiting any individual from transporting or storing a
firearm in a motor vehicle on any property designated for motor vehicle
parking . . . .”208 The statute requires the employee to have a legal permit
and to store the gun out of sight in a locked vehicle.209 Yet the law gives
the employer options to limit the storage of firearms.210 Unlike a handful
of statutes, Utah’s statute does not impose criminal liability211 but does

204. See discussion supra Part I.A.
205. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3 (West 2017).
206. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017); see also Puig v. Greater New
Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 772 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 2000). This statute
also doubles as a codified version of WDVPP. See discussion Part II.B.
207. Compare FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(a) (2017), with UTAH CODE ANN. §
67-21-3.
208. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a).
209. Id. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(i)−(iii).
210. See id. § 34-45-103(2)(a) (stating that employers may provide an alternate
parking lot or protected storage place before entering the normal parking area).
211. Id. § 34-45-105. Cf. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251.
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grant enforcement power to the state attorney general.212 The attorney
general may file an action seeking restitution for any individual who
suffers a loss based on a violation of the statute.213 Though an injured
party’s claim may be brought by a state attorney general, the statute is
unclear on whether it contemplates a private right of action for the
terminated employee.
Utah’s Parking Lot law purports to allow a private civil cause of action
for any “individual who is injured, physically or otherwise, as a result of
any policy or rule prohibited by” the Parking Lot law.214 An employee may
argue that this provision encompasses an action for wrongful discharge by
stating he has been “injured, physically or otherwise,” although this
language is ambiguous. By singling out physical injury and following with
a catchall term, the right of action may be limited to physical injuries and
those injuries that accompany physical injuries.215 The statute does not
explicitly mention termination or discrimination like the Parking Lot laws
of other states,216 posing the question of whether the Utah Legislature
actually intended to create a cause of action for termination in the
statute.217 This ambiguity thus warrants a determination as to whether the
statute protects a public policy made actionable by the state’s recognition
of the WDVPP tort.
Assuming the Parking Lot law does not grant a right of action to
terminated employees, an employee must look to Utah’s employment law
for recourse. In general, Utah recognizes the tort of WDVPP.218 In
Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that although every
statute cannot be an expression of public policy, “when the statutory
language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected
interests of society are substantial,” the statute provides a basis for a
WDVPP action.219 More recently, the court stated that it construes public
policy narrowly to guard only “those principles which are so substantial

212. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 34-45-105 (emphasis added).
215. One such akin injury is mental anguish, economic damages, or those that
might accompany physical injury. See, e.g., Susan A. Berson, The Taxation of
Tort Damage Awards and Settlements: When Recovering More for a Client May
Result in Less, 78 J. KAN. B. ASS’N. 21, 22 (2009).
216. See statutes cited supra note 114.
217. See discussion supra Part II.A.
218. See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992).
219. Id. at 1282.
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and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to [the]
importance for promotion of the public good.”220
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes four categories of
WDVPP: “(1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing
a public obligation, (3) exercising a legal right or privilege, and (4) reporting
to a public authority criminal activity of the employer.”221 The court is wary
of the exception’s broad application, but the court’s clear articulation of the
exception indicates that the Parking Lot law would encompass such a public
policy given the legislative history of the statute.222
Legislative drafts and comments during hearings are useful in
determining what public policy the Utah Legislature aimed to address with
this statute’s enactment.223 The sponsoring state senator indicated that he
drafted the original version of the Parking Lot law in response to a Utah
Supreme Court decision in which an employer terminated several
employees after seeing them with guns in the company parking lot.224 In
Hansen v. America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), the court found that the right to
keep and bear arms in Utah was a clear and substantial policy articulated
by the legislature in its debate over its Parking Lot law.225 The court,
however, declined to allow public policy to trump the property interests of
the employer.226 Because the sponsoring senator mentioned a case that
accepted the right to keep and bear arms as an important state public
policy, it follows that the public policy in enacting the Parking Lot law
was to go beyond the AOL court’s holding and allow the right to keep arms
to trump the employer’s property interest.227
Another possible clear and substantial public policy in the Parking Lot
law’s enactment is that of self-defense. Several times in the pre-enactment
discussion, parties spoke about the concern that workers, if unable to store

220. Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 625 (Utah 2015). The court
found that the public policy behind a “Stand Your Ground” law was self-defense
and that the public policy of self-defense was substantial enough to warrant an
exception to at-will employment. Id. at 625−29.
221. Id. at 628 (citing Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 952 (Utah 2004)).
222. Erin Bergeson Harris, Recent Development in Utah Law, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 215, 225 (2005).
223. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1999).
224. Utah Senate Floor, Utah State Senate-Day 35 2009 (part 2), UTAH
LEGISLATURE (2009), http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip
_id=8802&meta_id=425206 [https://perma.cc/8H99-EJ9N].
225. Hansen, 96 P.3d at 956.
226. Id.
227. See Utah State Senate-Day 35 2009, supra note 224.
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their firearms in their vehicles, would be at a loss for self-protection in their
daily commute to and from work.228 According to the Utah Legislature,
these two proffered public policies are of such clarity and importance to
warrant a recognition of the public policy exception when the Parking Lot
law is concerned. As such, a Utah employee fired because of a violation of
the statute was entitled to a WDVPP claim.
B. Louisiana: A Whistleblower State
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 32:292.1, or the Parking Lot law, prohibits
property owners and employers, among others, from stopping any person
from storing firearms in privately owned vehicles in parking areas.229 This
statute allows for the same alternative solutions for employers as Utah.230 Like
Utah and 47 other states,231 Louisiana recognizes at-will employment.232
Unlike Utah, however, Louisiana does not recognize the common-law tort of
WDVPP.233
Because WDVPP is unavailable, Louisiana’s whistleblower statute
provides an employee with a right of action for his employer’s illegal acts.234
Unlike the tort, an inquiry into legislative history is not as pertinent because
the whistleblower statute is not contingent upon some indeterminable public
policy.235 Instead, whether a right of action exists is purely a result of
statutory construction and application to the facts at issue.
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 23:967, the whistleblower statute first
enacted in 1997,236 provides for recovery in three situations. The first two
are more traditional forms of whistleblower claims—either the employee
discloses or threatens to disclose his employer’s violation237 or the
228. Id.; Senate Business and Labor Committee, UTAH LEGISLATURE, http://Utah
legislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=13862&meta_id=507029 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017) (beginning at 1hour 11minutes) [https://perma.cc/SJY3-YL 7Q].
229. LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2017).
230. See discussion supra Part V.A.
231. Swift, supra note 105, at 554.
232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2024 (2017) (“A contract of unspecified duration may be
terminated at the will of either party by giving notice, reasonable in time and form, to
the other party.”); see also id. art. 2747 (“A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant
attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for doing so.”).
233. See Guillory v. St. Landry Par. Police Jury, 802 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1986);
Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
234. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967.
235. A whistleblower statute is “an embodiment of the state’s public policy
against wrongful or retaliatory discharge.” Cavico, supra note 25, at 564.
236. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (1997).
237. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(1) (2017).
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employee testifies or informs a public body of the violation.238 The last
provision in Revised Statutes § 23:967(A)(3) goes beyond what is generally
considered a whistleblower claim, permitting a wrongful termination action
when the employee expresses his disapproval of the employer’s illegal act.239
Section 23:967(A)(3) states, “An employer shall not take reprisal against an
employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation
of law . . . objects to or refuses to participate in an employment act or practice
that is a violation of law.”240 As such, the employee must prove six elements
to recover: 241 (1) he was in good faith;242 (2) the act or practice actually
violated some state law;243 (3) he refused or objected to the employer’s act or
practice;244 (4) he informed his employer of the violation;245 (5) an adverse
employment action occurred;246 and (6) the adverse action resulted from the
whistleblowing activity.247
In the case of an employee like Swindol, who brought his gun to work
in accordance with state law and subsequently was terminated, several of
the elements of the whistleblower statute are easily met. Assuming the
employee is in good faith, a violation of state law may be established by
demonstrating the maintenance or enforcement of a company firearm ban,
both of which are prohibited by the Parking Lot law.248 The next element of
refusal or objection is satisfied by the employee’s actual gun storage on the
company’s premises. By ignoring company policy, the employee effectively
declines to acquiesce to the employer’s illegal practice. Turning to the last
238. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(2).
239. Several other states contain this type of refusal-to-participate provision.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.102(3) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 181.932(1)(3) (2017);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102, -1114 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. § 359:B4 (2017);
N.J. STAT. § 34:19-3 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-20 (2017).
240. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3).
241. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(B). The wrongfully terminated employee may recover
back pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or court costs. Id.
242. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A). This is a threshold question. See Accardo v.
La. Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 943 So. 2d 381, 385 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
243. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(1). If an employee can prove only that the
employer violated its own policy, the whistleblower claim will fail. Accardo, 943
So. 2d at 385; Odeh v. City of Baton Rouge, 191 F. Supp. 3d 623, 628 (M.D. La.
2017); Thomas v. La. Dep’t. of Social Servs., 406 F. App’x. 890 (5th Cir. 2010).
244. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3).
245. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A). See Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
State Univ., 72 F. Supp. 3d 627, 647 (M.D. La. 2014).
246. See Tatum v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 79 So. 3d 1094, 1104 (La. Ct. App.
2011), writ denied, 82 So.3d 290 (La. 2012).
247. See Herster, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 647.
248. See LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1.

2018]

COMMENT

1023

two elements of adverse employment action and causation, termination
explicitly falls within the statute’s definition of “reprisal,”249 and the close
temporal proximity of the refusal to participate to the reprisal is indicative
of a causal link.250
Thus far, five of the six identified elements will be met in a case with
facts similar to Swindol. The only element of the § 23:967(A)(3) action
posing an issue for employees terminated in violation of the Parking Lot
law is that which requires the employee to inform his employer of the
violation.251 This provision demands that if the employee believes an
actual violation has occurred, he first must inform his employer of the
possible violation before objecting or refusing to participate.252 In many
cases, an employee will not know to notify the employer first that its ban
is unlawful before bringing his gun to work to defy the company policy.
The case law signals, however, that this element is unavoidable—the
employee first must notify his supervisor before refusing to participate to
be protected under the whistleblower statute.253
The Parking Lot law clearly makes it illegal for companies to enforce
bans on firearms.254 As such, if an employer’s policy conflicted with that
law and the employer fired an employee for the gun, then the employee is
covered under Louisiana’s whistleblower statute, provided the employee
is in good faith and first notifies the employer of the ban’s illegality.255
The employee would have a right of action provided that reprisal was
made against him for “refus[ing] to participate in an employment act or
practice that is in violation of law.”256
249. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(C)(1).
250. See Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that
temporal proximity will support a finding of causation “when the protected act and
the adverse employment action are ‘very close’ in time”).
251. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A).
252. See Gerald J. “Jerry” Huffman, Jr., The New Louisiana Employment
Statutes: What Hath the Legislature Wrought, 58 LA. L. REV. 1033, 1061 (1998).
253. Mabry v. Andrus, 34 So. 3d 1075, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
254. See LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(C) , which states,
No property owner, tenant, public or private employer, or business entity
shall prohibit any person from transporting or storing a firearm pursuant
to Subsection A of this Section. However, nothing in this Section shall
prohibit an employer or business entity from adopting policies specifying
that firearms stored in locked, privately-owned motor vehicles on
property controlled by an employer or business entity be hidden from
plain view or within a locked case or container within the vehicle.
Id.
255. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3).
256. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Parking Lot laws, which are presumably constitutional, encompass the
rights to keep and bear arms and to self-defense. In their promulgation of such
statutes, legislatures elevated employees’ rights above their employers,
infringing upon companies’ private property rights. As such, companies can
no longer impose an outright ban on having firearms on company premises,
thus expanding the potential for workplace violence like that at Black &
Decker. Regardless of possible workplace violence, however, employers must
abide by the provisions of Parking Lot laws. When an employer neglects to
do so, an employee may recover for the violation of Parking Lot laws,
depending on the employment law of the state. Some generalizations are to
be made in determining whether a state’s law grants a remedy; for instance,
when a Parking Lot law neglects to grant an explicit remedy, employees can
recover under the tort of WDVPP or alternatively under a whistleblower
statute because Parking Lot laws encompass important public policies.
Recognition of either WDVPP or whistleblower status allows for public
enforcement of the laws: when an employee is terminated for storing his gun
in accordance with a Parking Lot law, the law grants him with the ability to
enforce the law by bringing a WDVPP or whistleblower action. In the event
that a state does not acknowledge WDVPP or a whistleblower exception, the
doctrine of employment-at-will prevails, and the violation is not actionable.
This Comment supposes that future courts should find merit in all future
actions brought by gun-storing terminated employees, meaning the Fifth
Circuit rightly decided Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corp. both as a
matter of law and of policy.
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